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Abstract 
Public-private partnerships are a vehicle used a lot by governments all around the world. 
When it was introduced the idea relied a lot on economic reasoning in which contracts, 
monitoring and performance criteria were important to achieve results. But from the 
beginning PPP’s were a hybrid idea because there were also assumptions about collaborations 
and synergy that fused the idea. In this chapter we explore the ideas behind PPP, the 
importance of collaboration to make PPP’s work and we show, with recent research results, 
that PPP’s actually need a mix of contracts and collaboration to work. 
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INTRODUCTION: THE COLLABORATIVE CHALLENGE OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS  
 
Beyond any doubt, public–private partnership (PPP) has become established as an 
important vehicle to realize infrastructure projects and public services, not only in 
governmental rhetoric, but also in daily governmental practice. In many countries, 
governments have turned to the idea of PPPs, or partnerships in general, as an effective way 
to realize better policy outcomes or to enhance investments in fields like infrastructure, health, 
or even social policy (Hodge, Greve, & Boardman, 2010). One of the core elements in PPP is 
the collaboration between parties from the public and the private domain. Governments aim to 
realize public infrastructures and services for the common good but have limited budgets and 
struggle with planning and managing complex projects, and private parties often have access 
to private funds, have expertise regarding the design and development of large infrastructure, 
and are better able to mitigate risks and manage large projects (Hodge & Greve, 2005).  
 
Collaboration and PPP 
PPP aims to realize collaboration between public and private actors in which they both 
commit their resources and capabilities to the realization of a common objective, such as the 
co-production of a public good or a public service and the public infrastructure that is required 
for this service (Klijn & Teisman, 2003). Collaboration then is defined as the joint action of 
two or more actors to align their activities, pool their resources, and achieve shared goals (see 
e.g. Huxham & Vangen, 2005; Keast, Brown, & Mandell, 2007). 
 
However, collaboration between governments and private parties is far from self-
evident. Governments pursue the common good but are bound by regulations and bureaucratic 
procedures, and, as a consequence of the democratic electoral cycle, they have a relatively 
short time perspective. In contrast, private parties are profit driven and require a longer-term 
perspective to be able to invest and get a return on investment. PPPs are of a hybrid nature. 
They bring together parties with different objectives, goals, and institutional logics, which are 
hard to align (Jacobs, 1992; Klijn & Teisman, 2003). This raises the question of how 
collaboration can be achieved in these hybrid PPPs and which governance mechanisms can be 
applied to accomplish commitment to a collaborative effort to realize public goals, products, 
or services. Thus, our aim in this chapter is to: 
- discuss the basic theoretical underpinnings of PPPs and elaborate the importance of 
collaboration in the functioning of PPPs (second and third sections), 
- take a closer look at the governance mechanisms that are in place in PPPs (third 
section) and evaluate their significance using recent empirical results from a large 
research project in which we have been involved within the last five years (fourth 
section), 
- discuss the consequences of our empirical findings regarding the hybrid nature of the 
governance of collaboration in PPPs (fifth section). 
 
  
PPP and Its Governance Modes 
PPPs can be roughly defined as a “more or less sustainable cooperation between 
public and private actors in which joint products and/or services are developed and in which 
risks, costs and profits are shared” (Klijn & Teisman, 2003, p. 137). Many different forms of 
public–private collaboration come under this heading. So, in the next section, we present a 
classification of public–private relationships and collaborations in order to position Design, 
Build, Finance, Maintain (DBFM), and Design, Build, Finance, Maintain, and Operate 
(DBFMO) contracts vis-à-vis other forms of PPPs. DBFM(O) contracts have become the 
dominant model of public infrastructure provision in many parts of the world and are central 
in the rest of our contribution.  
 
Next, we address the theoretical ideas underlying PPPs and the extent to which they 
succeed in realizing collaboration. In doing so, we argue not only that PPPs are hybrid in an 
empirical sense, but also that the theoretical body of knowledge underlying this phenomenon 
is of a hybrid nature. As a result, depending on the context, different governance logics are 
deemed as most appropriate regarding the governance of collaboration within PPPs. Most of 
the literature makes a distinction between contractual governance (steering achieved by 
contracts) and relational governance (steering using relational qualities like communication, 
conflict management, trust, and so on). To a certain extent, these governance logics may 
complement each other, but they are based on fundamentally different and contradictory 
theoretical assumptions and mechanisms. In practice, this may result in confusing, ineffective, 
and problematic governance hybrids. Therefore, the question that guides this contribution is 
how the respective governance mechanisms – contracts versus trust and management – 
contribute to the realization of collaboration in PPPs, and, more specifically, how they relate 
to each other and how they can be combined. In this contribution, we provide empirical 
evidence that suggests that neither of these governance mechanisms is sufficient on its own 
and that, in essence, the governance of collaboration entails finding the right mix of 
governance modes.   
 
 
FORMS OF PUBLIC–PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS 
 
In the literature on PPPs, two main dimensions underlying the various types of 
partnership can be distinguished (see Hodge & Greve, 2005; Osborne, 2000):  
 
1. The (formal) organization of the partnership: to what degree is the partnership organized 
in a strongly formalized form (like a contract or a newly set up organization) or in a more 
loosely coupled cooperation (like a network)? 
2. The nature of the relationship between the public and the private actors: is it a more or less 
horizontal relationship between equal partners, a principal to principal relation, or a 
principal–agent relationship, in which the principal (government) acts as the client that 
commissions an agent (private contractor) to execute a task, project, or service.   
  
When these two dimensions are combined (see Table 1), an overview of possible 
public–private relationships appears. Only forms 3 and 4 are actually considered in most 
literature as real PPP forms, but the table provides an overview of possible collaborations 
between public and private organizations 
  
  
Table 1: A typology of forms of public–private relationships 
Type of relation 
 
Organizational form 
Principal–agent relation Principal–principal relation 
(partnership) 
Loosely coupled 1. Interaction between public 
and private actors in 
implementing governmental 
policies and providing public 
services. Limited 
collaboration. Governments 
determine objectives and 
conditions for implementation. 
2. Network-like partnerships in 
developing policies, planning, 
or coordinating activities.  
Loosely coupled collaboration. 
Examples: preventive health 
networks for obesity, area 
development, or other networks 
where public and (semi-)private 
actors work together on more or 
less equal terms.   
Tight organizational 
form 
3. Design, Build, Finance, 
Maintain, (Operate) contracts. 
Collaboration is to a large 
extent determined by the 
contract. 
4. Consortium: Partners form a 
new organizational entity that 
implements a service or product 




Source: Adapted from Klijn (2010) 
 
The first type of PPP is characterized by a loosely coupled arrangement and a 
principal–agent relationship. This concerns relationships in which public actors involve 
private actors to provide services or policy outcomes that match the government’s goals and 
aims, including private actors’ implementation actions that fit in policy programs. The 
relation between private schools and public actors, where public actors support private 
schools and private schools provide services that fit public goals, is a relevant example (see 
for instance Weihe, 2008). One could question whether this type of relationship can be 
considered to be a PPP, because it is hardly a concrete partnership, but there are authors who 
consider this to be one (see the policy approach as discussed by Weihe, 2008). Activities, 
resources, and objectives are aligned only to a certain extent, as this type of relationship 
concerns policy implementation. Collaboration is therefore assumed to be limited. 
  
The second type of PPP refers to principal–principal relations with a loosely coupled 
organization form. This type of PPP has a network-like character with intense interaction 
between public and private actors in a weakly developed institutional setting and becomes 
more firmly arranged only by either a contract or an organizational form of partnership in 
implementing activities. It can be found in complex and enduring processes of development 
and decision making in urban restructuring. Despite the horizontal nature of these 
relationships, collaboration challenges still arise, as objectives and institutional logics are not 
necessarily aligned. Collaboration and its governance in this type of relationship are supposed 
to resemble networks and collaborative governance as discussed in the literature (Ansel & 
Gash, 2008; Kickert, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 1997). 
 
The third type of partnership is characterized by a tight, contractual organization form 
and a principal–agent relationship. Projects are often governed by a long-term infrastructure 
contract, such as a DBFM(O) contract, which is a well-known example of this form. These 
PPPs are inspired by the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) in the UK that gained popularity 
from the 1980s onwards. In the PFI context, long-term, integrated contracts were developed, 
and, with the help of these contracts, public actors tendered out the design, building, 
financing, maintenance, and possibly the operating of a public project to a private consortium. 
The classic example of this form is the Dartford Crossing over the Thames, which is financed 
with user fees (Hodge et al., 2010). The idea is that shifting the financial risk to the private 
consortium will create strong incentives to deliver and maintain the project within time, 
budget, and scope. The integrated nature of the contract motivates the private consortium to 
take the full lifecycle into account when designing the project. This allows for innovative 
solutions and the realization of efficacy gains, thus creating added value. The extended 
contract periods (20, 25 years, and more) allow the private parties to recoup their investments. 
Collaboration between public and private parties in this type of PPP is strongly regulated by a 
contract, and some theories suggest that actual collaboration is hardly necessary as the 
contract arranges everything (see Williamson, 1996) that is necessary. Other authors have 
stressed that, in the implementation phase of such relationships, contract parties may develop 
governance modes that stimulate collaboration and partnership relationships that go beyond 
simply implementing the contract (see Warsen, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2019; Weihe, 2008). 
 
The fourth type of PPP encompasses principal–principal relationships between public 
and private actors that jointly create and fund a separate organizational form, like a joint 
public–private venture. This type of PPP is often referred to as an institutional public–private 
partnership (or alliance). Examples include the urban regeneration companies (see Kort & 
Klijn, 2011; ODPM, 2004) that are emerging in various countries. Here, intensive interactions 
occur between the two partners that jointly develop and organize projects, services, or 
policies. In doing so, they share a common goal (or at least a set of goals) and associated 
benefits and risks. Such partnerships are often referred to as ‘real’ partnerships in which 
public and private partners really collaborate and can be distinguished from the third type of 
PPP, in which PPPs are often regarded as a way of contracting out. 
 
 
PPP AS A THEORETICAL HYBRID: GOVERNANCE LOGICS UNDERLYING PPP 
 
Besides confusion about the nature of PPPs, different implicit assumptions can be 
found in the literature about the mechanisms that make PPPs result in collaboration and 
realize collaborative advantages: for example, projects and services that are realized with 
private budgets, within time and budget, that are innovative and have added value (Ghobadian 
et al., 2004; Hodge & Greve, 2005; Savas, 2000). The key partnership mechanism in PPPs is 
that private parties are involved earlier and more intensively in the decision-making process 
than is the case with more traditional client–supplier or principal–agent relationships. The 
way in which this should be done and the assumptions about how this improves collaboration 
and outputs are quite different in the available literature, because the PPP concept is a hybrid 
idea. The PPP idea contains assumptions from two major theoretical perspectives in public 
administration: New Public Management (NPM) and network and collaborative governance. 
 
On the one hand, one can recognize ideas from NPM that have become dominant in 
public administration since the 1980s as a reaction to flaws of the Weberian Traditional 
Public Administration (TPA) (see Hughes, 2012). NPM is about the application of ways of 
organizing and managing that are common in the private sector to the public sector in order to 
enhance the performance, efficiency, and transparency of public organizations. In these ideas, 
governments should focus on the formulation of public policy and leave the implementation 
to other bodies (agencies at arms-length, private organizations, or non-profit organizations) 
(Osborne & Gaebler, 1992). A separation between policy formulation and policy 
implementation should be encouraged by privatization, outsourcing, agentification, and a 
stronger emphasis on market mechanisms and the involvement of private actors (Hood, 1991). 
Public actors should control implementation by competition, contracts, and the use of 
performance indicators and performance measurement. This debate on PPP is strongly 
inspired by ideas from NPM (Greve, 2007; Nao, 2002). Often, in this debate, the contractual 
character of PPP is stressed. Various phases of a project, like the design, building, financing, 
maintenance, and commercial operation of a public road or a public building like a school, 
hospital, prison, or governmental office are integrated into one contract (DBFM(O) contract), 
with the aim of realizing a lifecycle approach. The added value lies in the lower costs of 
coordination between the various components (often expressed as efficiency or value-for-
money gains) and in the realization of design optimizations aimed at realizing innovations that 
reduce costs in the building, maintenance, and operation phases. The consortium can, for 
instance, use more sustainable (expensive) building materials to save on future maintenance 
costs. The payment system rewards the ‘availability’ of roads (NAO, 2002; ODPM, 2004) 
rather than second-guessing the costs of constructing them. These contracts have durations of 
many years, often 20 years or more, during which private parties can recoup their investment.  
 
On the other hand, one can recognize ideas in the PPP literature that resemble the 
arguments presented in the vast literature on (network and collaborative) governance. These 
streams of literature stress the importance of horizontal coordination between public actors 
and their partners. They also emphasize that it is difficult or impossible to revert to top-down 
steering in a network society in which interdependence has increased consequent to processes 
of specialization, fragmentation, privatization, knowledge distribution, individualization, and 
rising demands (see Frederickson, 2005; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016a; Sørensen & Torfing, 
2007). The governance literature emphasizes the complex nature of decision making and 
service delivery, dependence on other actors, and the need for (horizontal) collaboration and 
active forms of network management that promote collaboration between public and private 
actors, that generate new innovative solutions and the use of knowledge among the actors, and 
that reduce veto powers and obstruction (see Agranoff and McGuire, 2001; Klijn & 
Koppenjan, 2016a). Recently, these ideas have been coined as the New Public Governance 
(NPG) perspective, often presented as the alternative to, and successor of, the NPM paradigm. 
NPG is not only of theoretical relevance. It is also a normative perspective that stems from 
and guides new practices within public administration that have emerged in response to both 
TPA and NPM (Bryson, Crosby, & Bloomberg, 2014; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016a; Koppenjan 
& Koliba, 2013; Osborne, 2006). Some core elements of the discussion on governance are 
present in the ideas on PPP. These include, for example, the assumption that co-production 
between public and private actors results in the exchange of more information and the usage 
of each other’s knowledge and thus generates more innovative ideas, better services, and 
better policy outputs for complex societal problems. 
  
PPP’s hybrid character makes it difficult to pin down what PPP as an idea stands for 
and how collaboration in PPPs actually takes shape. On the one hand, collaboration can be 
shaped using contracts, performance criteria, and sanctions (the NPM argument), whereas, on 
the other hand, collaboration in PPPs is governed by focusing on the informal relationships 
between project partners and includes the building of trust. According to the governance 
perspective, contracts can never be complete and are not fitted to deal with the complex 
nature of decision making. We elaborate on both reasonings in the next section. After that, we 
test both assumptions with some recent empirical research conducted by the authors in a four-
year research project on PPP governance. 
GOVERNANCE MECHANISMS IN PPPS: CONTRACTS VS TRUST AND 
MANAGEMENT  
 
As described in the previous section, two main theoretical arguments come from two 
different perspectives regarding collaboration in PPPs. The literature on (collaborative and 
network) governance emphasizes horizontal collaboration, management, and the building of 
trust (see Ansell & Gash, 2008; Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016a). The NPM perspective on 
partnerships suggests a (neo)institutional perspective and views contracts as crucial in 
realizing collaboration and projects. Buyers and sellers are led by their own rational behavior 
and are incentivized and constrained by contracts.  
 
Partnership as Risk-Taking and Contractual Safeguards: The Economic Perspective on 
Partnerships 
From a purely rational economic perspective, in partnerships (and PPPs) there is no 
need for collaborative activities or the concept of trust, even in more complex situations 
involving specific investments, uncertainties, and long-term relations. In situations of 
incomplete contracts (and incomplete information, as most theorists would embrace the idea 
of bounded rationality), most neo-institutional economists would suggest means other than 
trust and collaboration to address these uncertainties (see Williamson, 1996). They would 
stress that incomplete contracts should come with safeguard mechanisms to protect the 
contractor against other parties (Deakin and Michie, 1997; Nooteboom, 2002). Their solution 
to the problem of risk would most likely lie in contractual safeguards and reputation-related 
incentives (see Deakin & Michie, 1997). Monitoring the contract’s performance criteria, and 
whether thus the partner is abiding by the contract terms, would then be the counterpart of 
contractual safeguards. These safeguards can take the form of bonds, penalties, and other 
contractual agreements and should serve to prevent opportunistic behavior and facilitate the 
resolution of ex-post disputes between partners. Williamson (1996) goes so far as to contend 
that trust is a confusing concept because it amounts to nothing more than risk-taking. He says 
that: “calculative relations should be described in calculative terms, to which the language of 
risk is exactly suited” (Williamson, 1996, pp. 485–486). In his view, notions of trust only blur 
the argument, because they cause one party to accept the risk that the other party may be 
acting opportunistically. In his view, the notion of trust as acting in good faith (without 
calculation) does not add anything useful to the analysis of the situation. 
 
Complexity and the Need for Trust 
However, in contractual relations, in partnerships and other relationships involving 
private and public actors of various affiliations, actors are confronted with risks and 
uncertainties that can take various forms. Williamson, in rejecting the role of trust, assumes 
that these risks can be calculated or at least be taken into account by involved actors, but this 
assumption cannot be easily squared with the idea of bounded rationality, which is also the 
starting point in the neo-institutional approach (see Nooteboom, 2002). If the possibility of 
gathering information is limited, then so are the opportunities to assess the behavioral 
alternatives that independent actors have in a partnership. Interestingly, this argument holds 
even more strongly for situations where partnerships contain several actors or are 
characterized by a network of dedicated and involved actors and when partnerships extend 
over a long period (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016a).  
 
Given the duration of partnership contracts, the complexity of partnerships, and the 
high level of uncertainty, it is very unlikely that contracts can be the sole instrument used to 
organize partnerships. There are simply too many unforeseen futures to be specified in the 
contract and too many uncertainties about possible outcomes. This means that partnerships, 
although they may benefit from contracts, need additional conditions to achieve collaboration 
and good performance, like extensive relational management and trust building. This actually 
is the main assumption in the collaborative and network governance literature.  
 
The Importance of Trust, Collaboration, and Management 
Trust is needed to have actors invest in complex collaborations in which risks are 
involved, but trust cannot be assumed to be present. If it is present, it is vulnerable and needs 
to be nurtured (Klijn, Edelenbos, & Steijn, 2010). There are so many uncertainties and 
unforeseen developments in long-term partnerships that active (network) management is 
necessary to build trust, enhance collaboration, and reach satisfactory outcomes. 
 
Because of the characteristics of a partnership, whether it is a contractual or a network-
like type, network management is considered crucial to achieve coordination of actions and 
bring together the necessary resources (see also Gage & Mandell, 1990; Huxham & Vangen, 
2005; Kickert et al., 1997; McGuire & Agranoff, 2011). There is broad consensus in the 
literature about networks, collaborative governance, and interactive governance that the type 
of leadership and management required in networks and partnerships differs significantly both 
from interorganizational  management (aligning internal management functions – such as 
budgets, personnel, organization – with organizational objectives) and from contract 
management (in terms of keeping agents to the contract). Ansell and Gash (2008) talk about 
facilitating leadership; by which they emphasize that the important job of a leader is to 
mediate between actors and empower the collaboration process. In this literature, the 
deliberate guidance of complex governance processes is mostly called network management, 
but it is also referred to as network governance, collaborative governance, or meta-
governance (Mandell, 2001; O’Toole, 1988; Sørensen & Torfing, 2007). Usually, actions are 
characterized as activating actors, exploring solutions (and connecting perceptions and 
interests), arranging interactions, and setting up process rules. These management activities 
include addressing so-called soft dimensions of relationships: motivating actors, listening to 
their concerns, safeguarding their interests, investing in good relationships and a safe and 
inspiring collaboration environment, managing conflicts, building trust, and so forth.  The 
assumption here is that, when these (network) management and relational governance 
strategies are applied, trust is generated, collaboration is enhanced, and eventually better 
outcomes are achieved than if this is not the case. In the collaborative and network 
governance perspectives, the importance of contracts, monitoring, and sanctions would thus 
be greatly downplayed in favor of trust and other relational governance strategies. 
 
Conclusion: Relational Governance Is Necessary for Collaboration  
The theoretical sections have shown that PPP is a hybrid idea that combines various 
and sometimes contradictory governance ideas and assumptions. The two different 
perspectives discussed propose very different ways of governing PPP collaboration. 
 
Neo-institutional economics suggests an important role for contracts, strict contract 
management, including the use of performance indicators, and a clear risk division, whereas 
the governance perspective suggests trust and relational governance. The empirical research 
on PPPs has long focused on the different contractual forms of PPP, its promises, and its 
performance. In short, it has been concerned with questions about what PPPs are and what 
they can achieve (Hodge & Greve, 2017). Many of these studies focus on PPPs as a 
contractual model and a tool designed to effectively realize long-term infrastructural projects 
(e.g. Hodge et al., 2010). The NPM principles are often clearly reflected in these studies. As 
Wang et al. (2017) show, research on PPP within the public administration discipline has 
predominantly focused on the concept of PPP, the drivers of PPP adoption by governments, 
the allocation of risks between public and private partners, and the performance of the 
partnership. The management of these partnerships has also been the subject of earlier 
research (see for example Klijn & Teisman, 2003; Osborne, 2000). However, in the early days 
of PPP research, there was a lack of attention on relational governance and soft aspects such 
as trust, informal communication, and commitment. Relatively few scholars studied PPP from 
a governance perspective in which the relationship between public and private partners was 
not just a contract-based principal–agent relationship, but rather one in which horizontal 
principal–principal relationships could be established and soft elements such as trust were 
potentially crucial governance mechanisms. Reeves, for example, showed in his 2008 study 
that the relationships between public and private actors in PPPs in the Irish school sector had 
predominantly a transactional nature rather than a collaborative (trust-based) nature. 
Nevertheless, the attention paid to the soft side of these partnerships has been increasing. 
Several studies have examined the role of trust in these partnerships (e.g. Barretta, Busco, & 
Ruggiero, 2008; Brogaard, 2017; Edelenbos & Klijn, 2007; Panda, 2016; Smyth & Edkins, 
2007). Most of these studies indicate that trust plays an important role in PPPs. With the 
seemingly important role of both contractual and relational governance, the question arises as 
to the ratio required between these two governance mechanisms. Can we combine contractual 
and relational governance within the same PPP project? And how can they be combined?  
 
 
CONTRACTUAL VERSUS RELATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN PUBLIC–PRIVATE 
PARTNERSHIPS: WHAT DOES EMPIRICAL RESEARCH TELL US? 
 
In a large, four-year research project on smartening PPP governance, we examined a 
number of relevant assumptions about the influence of contractual and relational governance 
on the collaboration in these partnerships. First, we tested basic assumptions about the 
importance of contract characteristics and relational elements for PPP performance. Next, we 
studied PPP professionals’ perceptions on the management of collaboration in PPPs. Finally, 
we made an attempt to show that contractual and relational governance can be combined in 
PPPs in practice by providing insight into different mixes of both forms of governance in 
well-performing partnerships. 
 
The Role of Contracts in PPP 
To manage the collaborative effort that is central in PPPs, contracts are – from an 
NPM perspective – considered to be a crucial governance mechanism. In a survey of the vast 
majority of PPP projects in the Netherlands, we studied how the different contract 
characteristics affected the performance of these partnerships (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016b). 
These characteristics were the duration of the contract, the use of sanctions, and the 
complexity and flexibility of the contract. The duration of the contract was expected to have a 
positive relationship with PPP performance, as the long term of these contracts allows the 
private partner to recover its initial investment (Hodge et al., 2010). Moreover, the contracts’ 
long term implied that several project phases (design, build, maintenance) were integrated 
into the same contract, which allowed for lifecycle optimizations (e.g. NAO, 2002). From the 
neo-institutionalist economics perspective, the use of sanctions is particularly useful to 
prevent opportunistic behavior. The complexity of the contract and its flexibility and room for 
renegotiations are also expected to have an impact on partnership performance. Complex 
contracts require high transaction costs, making them less effective. Flexibility is often 
needed in long-term contracts to deal with unforeseen events or allow for renegotiations to 
prevent suboptimal outcomes (Verweij, 2015). A multilevel analysis (MLA)1 based on a 
survey among 144 public and private professionals (response rate of 46.6%) in 68 PPP 
projects in the Netherlands showed that these contract characteristics have only limited effect 
on PPP performance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016b). Neither complexity, flexibility, nor room 
for negotiation seem significantly related to the performance of these partnerships. Neither 
does the long duration of these contracts have a significant effect on PPP performance. 
Contrary to popular NPM beliefs underlying PPPs, the possibility of sanctions does not ensure 
collaboration between public and private actors. Instead, our results show a significant 
negative effect (-.051, with p < .05) on PPP performance. Sanctions do not ensure 
collaboration between project partners, but instead weaken the results of the collaborative 
effort in PPPs. Thus, although contracts are a core element of the organizational arrangements 
in PPPs and these results do not imply that contracts in PPPs are useless as a governance 
mechanism, some doubt is cast on the importance of contracts and specific contract 
characteristics for PPP performance. Contracts may be important to construct PPPs and as a 
fallback option when things go wrong, but the influence of formal contracts on good PPP 
performance seems to be overrated. These findings confirm our theoretical expectations that 
we need to look beyond contracts to properly understand and manage PPPs and their 
performance (Klijn & Koppenjan, 2016b). Other factors, perhaps under different assumptions 
regarding the collaboration of public and private actors in a PPP, are also important.  
 
Trust and Relational Governance 
The (network) governance literature contends that network management and trust are 
two of these factors. Trust creates greater predictability, reduces risks associated with 
opportunistic behavior, and stimulates the sharing of information (Nooteboom, 2002; 
Bachman & Zaheer, 2006). Trust can compensate for the uncertainty in partnerships and thus 
creates a basis for long-term collaboration (Parker & Vaidya, 2001; Ring & van der Ven, 
1992). Network management activities all focus on strengthening the collaboration between 
partners. They facilitate interaction between partners, try to enhance coordination, and aim to 
align the interests of partners in the network (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Huxham & Vangen, 
2005). Consequently, better collaboration should result in better performance. Our MLA 
shows that indeed trust is significantly correlated (p < .001) with collaboration in PPP projects 
(Warsen et al., 2018). Surprisingly, network management is not. One of the potential 
explanations here is that the effect between network management and collaboration is merely 
indirect, as network management also stimulates the building of trust. In turn, trust facilitates 
collaboration. Analysis of the effect of trust and network management on PPP performance 
revealed a significant correlation (management: p < .01; trust: p < .05). These results 
demonstrate the relevance of PPPs’ collaborative characteristics (Warsen et al., 2018) and call 
for more research into PPP under governance-based assumptions. Given the complexity of 
PPPs and their long duration, it is not surprising that collaborative elements are important 
governance mechanisms in these partnerships. After all, both complexity and the long 
timeframe make it hard to predict what will happen. Unexpected events will occur, and both 
trust and network governance are far better suited to deal with these uncertainties than rigid 
contracts (Warsen et al., 2018).  
 
1 In MLA, variables are analyzed at different levels (organizational, personal, and so on). In this case, as we had 
sometimes more than one respondent for each project, the variance of our outcomes was partly the result of 
variables at project rather than individual level, as individual and project levels were analyzed (40% of the 
variance of our outcomes was due to differences at project level), thus justifying MLA use. As the professionals 
working in similar projects might make similar responses, MLA was used to test our hypothesis on two levels – 
both individual and project – and to identify how much of the variation in the scores was attributable to group 
membership (i.e. to professionals working on the same project). 
Practitioners’ Perspectives on PPP Governance  
Research shows that relational governance is crucial for the realization of the 
collaborative efforts in PPPs. In practice, however, most PPP projects use contracts. The 
governance of these projects is hybrid in nature, and this may be confusing to the parties 
involved. This raises the question of how public and private professionals working in these 
partnerships think about the use of both contractual and relational governance in PPPs. What 
are their perceptions about the governance of PPPs? With partners coming from different 
institutional backgrounds and with different interests, PPPs need to be governed to ensure the 
project’s progress (Warsen et al., 2020). To examine this question, we conducted a study 
using Q-methodology.2 Based on 24 statements on different forms of management (from 
well-known governance paradigms in public administration such as Traditional Public 
Administration (TPA), New Public Management (NPM), New Public Governance (NPG), and 
self-organization), the study provides crucial insights into the perceptions of 119 PPP 
professionals from Denmark, the Netherlands, and Canada. Four different profiles regarding 
the governance of PPP can be distinguished (see table 2). 
 
Table 2. Four profiles on governing PPPs  
 
Practitioners’ opinions regarding PPP governance and design are not aligned. Some 
value a more performance and contract-based approach, whereas others opt for a strong focus 
on horizontal collaboration. For each of the four different perspectives, a mix of professionals 
from different countries, with different backgrounds and different levels of experience, adhere 
to the governance ideas presented in the perspective (Warsen et al., 2020). The first 
perspective clearly resembles the ideas of NPM and advocates contractual governance as the 
main governance mechanism. The relationship between the public and the private partner can 
be considered a principal–agent relationship, in which the principal tries to prevent 
opportunistic behavior by the agent. Professionals that share the second perspective have a 
preference for horizontal collaboration between project partners as the most prominent 
governance mechanism (NPG inspired). The third perspective held among PPP practitioners 
 
2 Q-methodology identifies people’s perceptions and uses a factor analysis to identify patterns in the way in 
which these perceptions correlate.   
is the opposite to the second perspective and focuses on the balance between the expertise of 
the private partner and the need for accountability to the public partner. This profile combines 
control (TPA and NPM elements) as the most prominent governance mechanism in the 
project with a relatively high degree of managerial freedom for the private partner (self-
organization). The fourth perspective expressed among PPP practitioners is based upon 
horizontal collaboration, trust, and managerial freedom as the main governance mechanisms. 
This perspective is predominantly self-organization oriented, with some governance elements 
(Warsen et al., 2020). 
 
These governance ideas of practitioners are of a hybrid nature, combining features of 
various theoretical paradigms. Moreover, as the study clearly shows, there are diverging 
perceptions about governing PPPs. Each of the four perspectives differs, and each attracts a 
varied audience of practitioners, from different countries and working for different aspects of 
the project. However, an additional regression analysis shows that country, level of 
experience, and the public/private distinction can make a difference for professionals’ 
viewpoints. Some perspectives are more dominant in one country than in another. The 
Canadian professionals, for example, are more often associated with the first profile, in which 
performance indicators and the enforcement of the contract by public partners are valued 
most. The Dutch professionals are, in contrast, significantly more likely to adhere to the 
second perspective (p < .001), which aligns with the strong Dutch administrative tradition of 
compromise and horizontal working relationships. Finally, the viewpoints represented by the 
fourth perspective can be found significantly more often among Danish practitioners (p < 
.01). The different administrative traditions and experiences with PPP might explain these 
differences. Danish (local) governments, for example, are not frequent users of PPPs, and this 
makes them relatively inexperienced compared to the private sector and perhaps therefore 
more inclined to give room to the private partner regarding the realization of the project 
(Warsen et al., 2020). It might not come as a surprise that there are also some differences in 
the viewpoints of public and private professionals regarding PPP governance. Although both 
can be found in all four profiles, the study indicates that private partners are more positive 
about the perspectives that emphasize horizontal collaboration (perspective 2, p < .05; and 
perspective 4, p < .01). Compared with public professionals, they are less likely to adhere to 
the ideas from perspective 1 on performance indicators and control (Warsen et al., 2019). As 
they are working for the agent in the principal–agent relationship, these indicators provide 
strict boundaries within which they should work and limit their autonomy to act. Finally, 
experience seems to have an impact on professionals’ perceptions, in particular with regard to 
the autonomy of the private partner. Experienced professionals are more positive about the 
fourth perspective (p < .05) in which the private actor’s behavior is not enforced via strict 
contracts; rather, the private actor is allowed a high degree of managerial freedom (Warsen et 
al., 2020). 
 
Getting the Right Mix for PPP: Contractual and Relational Governance 
Professionals’ hybrid perceptions regarding PPP governance encourage further 
research into the hybridity of governing the collaborative efforts underlying these 
partnerships. Given the hybrid ideas underlying PPPs and PPP governance, how can we 
achieve collaboration in these partnerships? Can we merge these diverging perceptions in a 
mix of different governance mechanisms? Several studied propose the idea that PPPs might 
benefit from a mix of contractual and relational governance (e.g. Brown, Potoski, & van 
Slyke, 2016; Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012; Parker & Hartley, 2003; Poppo & Zenger, 2002). 
Whereas the contract provides clarity regarding the tasks, roles, and responsibilities of both 
partners, relational governance provides some room for flexibility in the event of 
circumstances changing. The question remains as to which mix of contractual and relational 
governance mechanisms might contribute to the success of PPPs. Using a fuzzy set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis3 of 25 PPP projects in the Netherlands and Flanders 
(Belgium), we identified several mixes of conditions that are present in highly successful PPP 
projects (Warsen et al., 2019). The contractual elements in our study were the allocation of 
risks and the strict application of sanctions, whereas trust and conflict management were 
considered relational elements. Each of these paths is discussed briefly below. 
 
The first mix of contractual and relational governance mechanisms in successful PPPs 
is the combination of high levels of trust combined with good risk allocation. The allocation 
of risks might provide clarity as to the tasks and responsibilities of each actor. As the 
allocation of risks is determined in the early phases of the process, trust can then be used to 
manage the project in the later stages and help partners to continue collaborating when the 
allocation of risks needs to be altered. The second mix combines the allocation of risks with 
conflict management and the strict application of sanctions. All three conditions here point 
toward the importance of clear agreements. The allocation of risks comprises agreements 
regarding tasks and responsibilities, whereas the sanctions are agreements regarding the 
enforcement of the contract. Conflict management includes (informal) agreements regarding 
the prevention, control, and resolution of disagreements and conflicts. These agreements help 
to ensure a good collaborative process and might thus lead to good performance. The final 
mix consists of a combination of two relational elements, namely trust and conflict 
management. Surprisingly, this mix explicitly includes the absence of a strict application of 
sanctions as a condition. This path is in line with the theories on collaborative governance and 
suggests that contractual elements are not necessary to prevent opportunistic behavior 
(Warsen et al., 2019).   
     
 
REFLECTION: HYBRIDITY AND BALANCING CONTRACTS AND 
COLLABORATIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT   
 
In this contribution, we have examined the hybrid nature of the governance of PPP 
collaboration. First of all, we stated that PPPs as hybrid arrangements provide challenges to 
arrive at collaboration between public and private actors – hence the importance of the 
governance of PPP collaboration. However, theories on PPP governance are hybrid 
themselves, mixing elements of various governance approaches, more specifically ideas from 
the NPM and governance perspectives. Focusing on contractual PPPs and in particular DBFM 
contracts, we have shown that ideas on the role of contracts are complemented with the 
acknowledgement that the complex nature of projects governed by DBFM contracts, and the 
long and enduring relationships that they imply, require additional governance mechanisms 
like trust and relational governance. This gives rise to the question of how this hybridity can 
be dealt with: how these elements relate to each other and what mixes enhance collaboration 
and performance.  
 
 
3 QCA is a method that assumes that “the effect of a single condition unfolds only in combination with other 
conditions” (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012, p. 78). This means that performance is explained not by a single 
condition, but by a combination of conditions. Furthermore, another underlying principle of this method is that 
an outcome, such as performance, can be achieved through multiple paths (Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). Just 
as with the proverbial city of Rome, various combinations of conditions may result in the same outcome. The 
particular characteristics of this method allow one to study combinations of various governance mechanisms to 
see which combinations are present in successful PPPs and how contractual and relational (collaborative?) 
governance mechanisms can be combined.   
The results of the empirical studies discussed confirm that contracts alone do not 
generate good partnership performance. Only if combined with more relational governance 
elements can contracts have positive impacts.  
Our research also shows that practitioners’ governance ideas are of a hybrid nature, 
combining features of various theoretical paradigms. What is more, among themselves, 
practitioners have diverging perceptions about managing PPPs, resulting in diverging 
expectations and misinterpretations, thus contributing to the hybrid nature of PPPs’ 
collaborative governance practices in a negative sense.   
In addition, our studies shed light on the hybrid nature of governance attempts 
underlying successful PPPs. Successful PPPs always included at least one of the relational 
governance elements, whether that was trust or conflict management. This highlights the 
importance of relational governance, even within contract-based PPPs. In two of the three 
mixes, these collaborative conditions were combined with risk allocation as the contractual 
element. These mixes are in line with previous studies that argue that collaborative and 
contractual governance are mutually complementary (e.g. Edelenbos & Eshuis, 2012; Poppo 
& Zenger, 2002). As the theory of incomplete contracting suggests, a contract cannot cover all 
potential events and circumstances, especially not in the complex and long-term projects that 
characterize PPPs. Relational governance is needed to successfully manage uncertainties in a 
project. So, to make collaborative efforts in PPPs successful, it is the mix that matters. 
Besides the presence of a contract, project partners should invest in relational governance 
mechanisms, such as trust and good conflict management.  
This means that, in our further theorizing of PPPs, we have to pay much more attention not 
only to relational governance but also to the hybridity that characterizes the governance of 
PPP collaboration: the interplay of contractual characteristics and stricter forms of contract 
management with relational governance and the building of trust. Our QCA identified three 
specific pathways that mixed these elements in a particular way. However, as this research 
was limited in scope, future research should investigate the implications and potentials of 
various mixes in greater depth (to increase our understanding of the hybrid mechanisms at 
play) and in a more quantitative way (to ascertain the generalizability of our findings), beyond 
the specific context of Dutch DBFM projects, widening the scope to other PPP arrangements 




Agranoff, R., & McGuire, M. (2001). Big questions in public network management research. 
Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 11(3), 295–326. 
Ansell, C., & Gash, A. (2008). Collaborative governance in theory and practice. Journal of 
Public Administration Research and Theory, 18(4), 543–571. 
Bachman, R., & Zaheer, A. (Eds.). (2006). Handbook of trust research. Cheltenham: Edward 
Elgar. 
Barretta, A., Busco, C., & Ruggiero, P. (2008). Trust in project financing: An Italian health 
care example. Public Money and Management, 28(3), 179–184.  
Brogaard, L. (2017). The impact of innovation training on successful outcomes in public–
private partnerships. Public Management Review, 19(8), 1184–1205.  
Brown, T. L., Potoski, M., & van Slyke, D. M. (2016). Managing complex contracts: A 
theoretical approach. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 26(2), 294–
308. 
Bryson, J. M., Crosby, B. C., & Bloomberg, L. (2014). Public value governance: Moving 
beyond traditional public administration and the new public management. Public 
Administration Review, 74(4), 445–456. 
Deakin, S., & Michie, J. (Eds.). (1997). Contract, co-operation, and competition: Studies in 
economics, management and law. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
Edelenbos, J., & Eshuis, J. (2012). The interplay between trust and control in governance 
processes: A conceptual and empirical investigation. Administration & Society, 44(6), 
647–674.  
Edelenbos, J., & Klijn, E-H. (2007). Trust in complex decision-making networks: A 
theoretical and empirical exploration. Administration & Society, 39(1), 25–50. 
Frederickson, H. G. (2005). What happened to public administration? Governance, 
governance everywhere. In E. Ferlie, L. Lynn, & C. Pollitt (Eds.), The Oxford handbook 
of public management (pp. 281–304). Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Gage, R. W., & Mandell, M. P. (Eds.). (1990). Strategies for managing intergovernmental 
policies and networks. New York: Preager. 
Ghobadian, A., Gallear, D., O’Regan, N., & Viney, H. (Eds.). (2004). Public-private 
partnerships: Policy and experience. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
Greve, C. (2007). Recent insights into the performance of public-private partnerships in an 
international perspective. Tidskrifted Politik, 10(3), 73–82. 
Hodge, G., & Greve, C. (2005). The challenge of public–private partnerships. Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar. 
Hodge G. A., & Greve, C. (2017). On public-private performance: A contemporary review. 
Public Works Management & Policy, 22(1), 55–78. 
Hodge, G., Greve, C., & Boardman, A. (2010). International handbook on public–private 
partnerships. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Hood, C. (1991). A public management for all seasons. Public Administration, 69(Spring), 3–
19. 
Hughes, O. E. (2012). Public management and administration: An introduction (4th ed). 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Huxham, C., & Vangen, S. (2005). Managing to collaborate: The theory and practice of 
collaborative advantage. London: Routledge 
Jacobs, J. (1992). Systems of survival. London: Random House. 
Keast, R., Brown, K., & Mandell, M. (2007). Getting the right mix: Unpacking integration 
meanings and strategies. International Public Management Journal, 10(1), 9–33. 
Kickert, W. J. M., Klijn, E-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (Eds.). (1997). Managing complex 
networks: Strategies for the public sector. London: Sage. 
Klijn, E-H. (2010). Public–private partnerships: Deciphering meaning, message and 
phenomenon. In G. Hodge, C. Greve, & Boardman (Eds.), International handbook on 
public–private partnerships (pp. 68–80). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
Klijn, E-H., Edelenbos, J., & Steijn, B. (2010). Trust in governance networks: Its impact and 
outcomes. Administration & Society, 42(2), 193–221. 
Klijn, E-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2016a). Governance networks in the public sector. 
London: Routledge 
Klijn, E-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2016b). The impact of contract characteristics on the 
performance of public–private partnerships (PPPs). Public Money & Management, 36(6), 
455–462. 
Klijn, E-H., & Teisman, G. R. (2003). Institutional and strategic barriers to public-private 
partnership: An analysis of Dutch cases. Public Money and Management, 23(3), 137–146. 
Koppenjan, J., & Koliba, C. (2013). Transformations towards New Public Governance: Can 
the new paradigm handle complexity? International Review of Public Administration, 
18(2), 1–8. 
Kort, M., & Klijn, E-H. (2011). Public private partnerships in urban renewal: Organizational 
form or managerial capacity. Public Administration Review, 71(4), 618–626. 
Mandell, M. P. (Ed.). (2001). Getting results through collaboration: Networks and network 
structures for public policy and management. Westport: Quorum Books. 
McGuire, M., & Agranoff, R. (2011). The limitations of public management networks. Public 
Administration, 89(2), 265–284. 
NAO. (2002). Managing the relationship to secure a successful partnership in PFI projects. 
London: NAO. 
Nooteboom, B. (2002). Trust: Forms, foundations, functions, failures and figures. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. 
ODPM. (2004). Urban regeneration companies – Guidance and qualification criteria. 
London: Office of the Deputy Prime Minister.  
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Re-inventing government: How the entrepreneurial spirit 
is transforming the public sector. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley  
Osborne, S. P. (Ed.). (2000). Public-private partnerships: Theory and practice in 
international perspective. London: Routledge. 
Osborne, S. P. (2006). The New Public Governance. Public Management Review, 8(3), 377–
387. 
O'Toole Jr., L. J. (1988). Strategies for intergovernmental management: Implementing 
programs in interorganizational networks. International Journal of Public Administration, 
11(4), 417–441. 
Panda, D. K. (2016). Public-private partnerships and value creation: The role of relationship 
dynamics. International Journal of Organizational Analysis, 24(1), 162–183. 
Parker, D., & Hartley, K. (2003). Transaction costs, relational contracting and public private 
partnerships: A case study of UK defence. Journal of Purchasing and Supply 
Management, 9(3), 97–108. 
Parker, D., & Vaidya, K. (2001). An economic perspective on innovation networks. In O. 
Jones, S. Conway, & F. Steward (Eds.), Social interaction and organisational change: 
Aston perspectives on innovation networks. London: Imperial College Press. 
Poppo, L., & Zenger, T. (2002). Do formal contracts and relational governance function as 
substitutes or complements? Strategic Management Journal, 23(8), 707–725. 
Reeves, E. (2008). The practice of contracting in public private partnerships: Transaction 
costs and relational contracting in the Irish schools sector. Public Administration, 86(4), 
969–986. 
Ring, P. S., & Van der Ven, A. (1992). Structuring cooperative relations between 
organizations. Strategic Management Journal, 13(7), 483–498. 
Savas, E. S. (2000). Privatization and public-private partnerships. New York: Seven Bridges. 
Schneider, C. Q., & Wagemann, C. (2012). Set-theoretic methods for the social sciences: A 
guide to qualitative comparative analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. 
Smyth, H., & Edkins, A. (2007). Relationship management in the management of PFI/PPP 
projects in the UK. International Journal of Project Management, 25(3), 232–240. 
Sørenson, E., & Torfing, J. (Eds.). (2007). Theories of democratic network governance. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.  
Verweij, S. (2015). Once the shovel hits the ground: Evaluating the management of complex 
implementation processes of public-private partnership infrastructure projects with 
qualitative comparative analysis. Doctoral thesis. Rotterdam: Erasmus University 
Rotterdam.  
Wang, H., Xiong, W., Wu, G., & Zhu, D. (2017). Public–private partnership in public 
administration discipline: A literature review. Public Management Review, 20(2), 293–
316. 
Warsen, R., Greve, C., Klijn, E-H., Koppenjan, J. F. M., & Siemiatycki, M. (2020). How do 
professionals perceive the governance of public-private partnership? Evidence from 
Canada, the Netherlands and Denmark. Public Administration 98: 124-139  
Warsen, R., Klijn, E-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2019). Mix and match: How contractual and 
relational conditions are combined in successful public–private partnerships. Journal of 
Public Administration and Theory, 29(3), 375–393. 
Warsen, R., Nederhand, J., Klijn, E-H., Grotenbreg, S., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (2018). What 
makes public–private partnerships work? Survey research into the outcomes and the 
quality of cooperation in PPPs. Public Management Review, 20(8), 1165–1185. 
Weihe, G. (2008). Ordering disorder: On the perplexities of the partnership literature. The 
Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67(4), 430–442. 
Williamson, O. E. (1996). The mechanisms of governance. London: Oxford University Press. 
 
